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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
damage judgment, there is no question that the newspaper involved would
have difficulty paying this award and those which would probably be
awarded in other suits.32 As a practical matter, however, once the awards
were paid, the only effect the decision would have would be to cause the
newspapers to refrain from accepting this type of advertising. Editorial
policy of the major newspapers would normally preclude any such suit for
articles written and published by the newspapers.
The major effect then, would be on the minority groups. If newspapers
like the New York Times refused to accept advertisements such as involved
here, perhaps the prime source used by minority groups to bring their
views before the public would be unavailable. Nowhere could these groups
as effectively advocate integration, Free Cuba, bible reading in schools, or
any other views not acceptable to the majority.
By reaching the instant decision, the Court has effectively given to
these minority groups the protection they need, without specifically stating
that that was one of the considerations in the decisions. Thus, the Court
has insured that these groups can raise their voices and allow "right
conclusions" to be "gathered out of a multitude of tongues. '33
Michael A. Macchiaroli
PENSION PLANS-SALE OF COMPANY DIVISION TO THIRD PARTY Is
NOT A DISCONTINUANCE UNDER PLAN So As To VEST EMPLOYEES'
BENEFIT RIGHTS.
Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc. (N.Y. 1963)
Plaintiffs, former salaried employees of defendant company, sued to
adjudicate their rights under a pension and retirement plan established
by the defendant. The plan provided that employees should have no vested
rights until they had accumulated five years of service or until the plan
itself was discontinued. While none of the plaintiffs had served for five
years, they claimed that defendant's sale of the company division1 in which
official action on the other. The Court there found that the protest was added only
to evade the ordinance and thus the instant Court dismissed the argument by saying
that "the publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which
the word was used in Chrestensen." 84 S.Ct. 710, 718.
32. In Alabama courts at the time this case was decided there were eleven libel
suits pending against the Times seeking $5,600,000 damages.
33. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(opinion of Judge Learned Hand).
1. The defendant company was composed of the Ticonium and the Transporta-
tion Divisions. Each was separate for accounting purposes, as well as for most of
the services provided by salaried employees. In connection with the sale of its Trans-
portation Division to Midland-Ross Corporation, CMP further covenanted not to
compete in the field with its purchaser for a five year period.
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they were employed constituted such a discontinuance as to vest their
rights. In a four-to-three decision,2 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court decision for the plaintiffs,3 holding that there was
no "discontinuance" since the plan was still in operation as to those
employees working in defendant's remaining division. Fernekes v. CMP
Indus., Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 246 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1963).
The technical basis of this case lies in the definition of the term
"discontinuance." If there were but one reasonable legal interpretation for
the word, the decision of the court here would necessarily stand un-
challenged. The majority's analysis of precedent, however, is far from
satisfactory. In finding a "sufficient discontinuance," the lower court cited
the case of Longhine v. Bilson4 and distinguished the cases of Schneider
v. McKesson & Robbins5 and Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co.6
The Court of Appeals does just the contrary.
In Longhine, a welfare association composed of the employees of three
separately incorporated but singly controlled corporations was sued by
members employed by one company which was going out of business.
While the plan was found to be active as to those members still working,
the dismissal of the plaintiffs, who constituted about one-half of the associa-
tion, was held to be such a discontinuance as would vest plaintiffs' rights.
The court concluded that an "en masse separation" for reasons totally
beyond the employees' control was not to be included under the "separation
without benefits" clause of the association's articles.
While there is a distinction between Fernekes and Longhine, in that
the former involves an employer-imposed plan and the latter a self-sustaining
employee organization, 7 on the facts relevant to an interpretation of the
term "discontinuance" they are quite similar. Longhine involved three
companies under basically the same management; Fernekes, two separate
divisions of the same company.8 Both involved the lay-off of almost
one-half of the eligible members of the plan; both had certain members
continuing to receive the usual benefits.
In Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins,9 employees of one of defendant
company's many divisions sued to vest their rights under a gratuitous
pension plan comparable to that in Fernekes. In distinguishing Longhine,
2. Foster, J., wrote the majority opinion with Dye, Burke and Scileppi, JJ.,
concurring, while Van Voorhis, J., dissented with the concurrence of Desmond, C.J.,
and Fuld, J.
3. Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 128, 222 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1961).
4. 159 Misc. 111, 287 N.Y. Supp. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
5. 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
7. This distinction is much less significant than it would appear to be on its face.
For, as will be shown, no matter what the origin or nature of the plan, the employee
will be contributing to its maintenance.
8. As was pointed out by the dissent, the plan expressly provided that "the two
Divisions shall be considered as though they were separate companies, and the amount
contributed on behalf of the employees of each Division shall be limited to the amount
which would have been allowable if such Division were a separate company." 13
N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 889, 146 N.Y.S.2d 201, 208 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
9. 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958).
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the court stated that the "opening and closing of sales offices was a normal
incident of business .... The closing of [plaintiffs'] division did not result
in a marked contraction of corporate activity."' 10 The very circumstances
which prevented the Schneider court from granting plaintiffs a remedy are
present in Fernekes. Moreover, in Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co.,"
where the plaintiff employees were again denied a remedy, in addition to
stressing the more severe contractual limitations on plaintiffs' rights, the
court emphasized as an alternative basis for its decision the fact that only
a small percentage of the employees of the corporation had been laid off.
The analytical bases presented by these courts for their decisions
therefore devolve into two: (1) the percentage of employees affected and
(2) the nature of the corporate business and the substantiality of the effect
of the lay-off on it. Using these bases as points of comparison, it is
apparent that only Longhine's approaches those presented in Fernekes.
The results arrived at, however, are obviously opposed. Longhine favored
a liberal interpretation of a contractual term in order to arrive at what it
felt to be an equitable result. Thus, in order to place the instant case in
its proper perspective, it is necessary to determine just what are the full
equities involved, and given the present facts, how they should have been
balanced.' 2 Before the equities of the court's interpretation may be validly
judged, however, the nature of the plan itself must be analyzed. Basically,
it is an employer originated, non-negotiated employee benefit plan. This is
10. Id. at 830.
11. 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
12. The problem of vested employee rights in pension plans, while relatively new,
has come under judicial scrutiny in an appreciable number of cases. The following
statistical analysis of eight of the more leading cases in the area indicates the course
thus far followed in the Fernekes situation:
Percentage of
Case Origin of Plan Employees Affected Recovery
FERNEKES Employer 50 No
LoNGHINV Employee Ass'n 50 Yes
SCHNEIDER Employer 1.6 No
BAILEY Employer 5.2 No
GEORGE Bargained 95 No
LOCAL 2040 Bargained 100 No
GORR Bargained 87 No
KARCZ Bargained 100 No
Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 246 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1963); Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. 111, 287 N.Y. Supp. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Bailey v.
Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ;
George v. Haber, 343 Mich. 218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955) ; Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884,
80 S.Ct. 155 (1959); Gorrv. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d
772 (1958) ; Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 155 N.E.2d 441 (1959).
While plaintiff employees have obviously had little fortune in pursuing their remedies,
the chart is misleading as to the conclusions it presents insofar as it does not indicate
where. specific contractual terms may have made the result arrived at inevitable. What
it does indicate, inter alia, is that where the pension is bargained, courts have yet to
interpret its terms favorably to employees. The rationale seems to be that since the
employees have entered into active negotiation of terms, they will not be given any
benefits of interpretation.
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not to say that it is strictly gratuitous - in fact to hold so would eliminate
much of the reason for liberal construction of its terms. It is a contract.
When pension plans first were initiated, they were considered to be
revocable at the employer's will 8 - especially when a clause to that effect
was inserted in the plan's provisions. 14 While this power, exercised fully,
could have rendered the entire concept of a pension plan meaningless,
employers' desire for good will introduced a certain amount of stability
into the area. Nevertheless, the courts initially evidenced little sympathy
for the employee. Gradually this attitude changed, and a contract concept
developed. The existence of an agreement and the meeting of the parties'
minds were obvious; the difficulty lay in finding the necessary consideration.
If there were consideration on the part of the employees, then there would
be an enforceable contract, and the interpretation of its terms would
assume substantive meaning.15
Basically there are two'6 possible theories through which consideration
can be found: (1) the induced longevity of the employee's service17 and
(2) the analysis of the plan itself as a deferred wage. No employer, by
hiring his employee, contracts for the latter's continuous service. While
he may expect the employee to remain with him for a reasonable, albeit
indefinite, time, there is no underlying obligation to do so on the part of
the employee. While the establishment of a pension plan certainly does not
create such a duty, it does obtain for the employer a certain security that
the relationship will be of some duration. The employee on the other hand
relies on the benefits to be derived from longevity; it will cause him both
to apply himself to his work to guarantee his continued personal employ-
ment and to forego other job offers of more immediate value because of the
future benefits to be received from his present employer.1 8  While the
theory possesses much validity, it is not completely satisfactory in the
present situation. For where disassociation is effected before eligibility,
consideration fails. The employer will not receive his longevity; this is not
altered by the fact that the employee is willing to provide it. Furthermore
since the employee, in order to gain the benefit of an estoppel, must show sub-
stantial injury through reliance, it would seem that the evidentiary problems
involved in pressing a suit on this theory could well be insurmountable. 19
13. See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 461, 464-67 (1955).
14. In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Dolan v. Heller
Bros. Co., 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (Ch. 1954).
15. If the plan were a mere gratuity, it would be totally subject to employer
control, hence rendering meaningless any dispute as to the meaning of particular
terms. For, the employer would then be empowered to remove the entire plan, without
sanction, and not need to concern himself with precise exculpatory terminology.
16. See AARON, LGAL STATUS op EMPLoYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATZ
PINSION PLANS 4-14 (1961).
17. There are actually two sides to the coin. One is that since the employee is
induced to remain in hope of future benefits, an estoppel is raised. The other is that
since longevity is something more than the employer is entitled to by the very fact
that he is an employer; this in itself constitutes formal contractual consideration:
a unilateral contract.
18. See TILOvp, PtNSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIc FREEOM 20,23 (1959).
19. How many employees, for example, could prove that they had turned down
specific job offers elsewhere, that by turning down such a job they suffered "substan-
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In view of the problems inherent in the abortion of these voluntary
employer plans, it is perhaps not surprising that there has been a recent
emphasis on a "deferred wage" theory. Under this theory pension
plans are considered as part of an employee's wages - payments due to
him for the standard work which he performs, whereby disbursement is
delayed until a future date. In effect it makes every plan a contributing
one on the part of the employee.
This theory was not fully advanced until the coming of collective
bargaining. As soon as courts held that pension plans were proper subjects
for collective bargaining, 20 it was inevitable that they should consider them
as part of the employer's consideration for the employee's work. In Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 2a the United States Court of Appeals expressed the
view that the company's pledge forms part of the consideration for the work
performed. Therefore, an employee should be able to sue under the plan
to recover his benefits if the company refused to pay. "In this view, the
pension thus promised would appear to be as much a part of his 'wages'
as the money paid him at the time of the rendition of his services. '22
(Emphasis added.)
It is significant to note that the plan to which the court refers is
voluntary, initiated by the employer as in Fernekes.23 Under this deferred
compensation theory, there are no problems created by pre-eligibility
disassociation. Since the employee has been "contributing" consistently,
there is no failure of consideration on his part. In the period of employ-
ment, he has supported his part of the bargain. Admittedly the employee,
as a rule, waives his rights under the contract by agreeing to certain forms
of eligibility requirements. But that is the point. The employee is waiving
a contractual right; he is losing something to which he would have other-
wise been entitled. He is not merely failing to recover the benefits of a
gratuitous transfer. Since this is a waiver, it is valid only to the extent
that it was intended by the parties to the contract themselves. To allow
the employee virtually to give away all his rights would not only constitute
unjust enrichment, it would come close to destroying the essence of
the contract.
Applying this discussion to Fernekes, it is evident that there is a
valid contract, that the employe(es) had waived certain rights to benefits
tial" injury? While there are two cases which have held that such an estoppel might
be a sufficient basis for holding an employer liable on a plan, it is notable that this
was done only alternatively, indicating the probable evidentiary difficulties. See West
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1951) ; Hunter v. Sparling,
87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948). See also Comment, Consideration for the
Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 96, 99 (1955).
20. Hunter v. Sparling; supra note 19. See also 1 CORIN, CONTAC'rS § 153, at
502 n.12 (1950).
21. 170 F2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960, 69 S.Ct. 887, cert.
granted on different issue and aff'd, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1949).
22. Id. at 253.
23. See Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down - Problems
and Some Proposals, 76 HARy. L. Rgv. 952, 959-62 (1963).
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thereunder in order to make the plan practical, and that there is-a term
"discontinuance" which must be interpreted.
There is a definite rule of contractual construction that in cases of
ambiguity a document is to be construed most strongly against its maker.2 4
In frequently ignoring this rule, courts fear that in situations such as
Fernekes a too liberal vesting of employees' rights will cause pension plans
to be either unworkable or prohibitively expensive. While this fear has a
very substantial basis, in the instant context it is misplaced.
Pension plans are the highly integrated end products of detailed cost
computation. They are stretched on a framework of analytical actuarial
tables specifically established for particular situations. These tables weigh
the factors of desired benefit amounts with the average rate of plant turn-
over and compute an estimated cost. The rate of turnover plays the major
part in this cost analysis, for each "turnover" is a recontribution to the
fund. In other words, the money contributed for one individual goes into
the general fund upon that individual's discharge. If a mass division shut-
down similar to the one in Fernekes can be classified as just an ordinary
turnover, then no rights seemingly should accrue to the employee. The
credits of the particular employee have been previously allocated. If,
however, such a mass separation is considered as something more than an
ordinary turnover, that is, as a fundamental change in corporate structure,
then preventing the vesting of an employee's rights will unjustly enrich
the employer. It gives him the benefit of a turnover totally unforeseen
when the original actuarial tables were drawn up.25 While non-eligibility
provisions are reasonable and, in fact, perhaps essential, there are no
compelling reasons why the benefits of an unforeseen shutdown should go
to the employer instead of the employees discharged. And most assuredly,
that is where the benefits will go. For with the extra credits derived from
the recontribution of the separated employee's shares, the employer will be
relieved of some of his contractual burdens. It is submitted that this is a
patently unjustified result.
The plan in Fernekes, while spontaneously employer originated was a
contract in which ambiguous terms should be construed against the drawer;
to rule otherwise is to frustrate the very purpose of such a plan. Further-
more, a decision in favor of the plaintiffs would not adversely affect the
interests of those employees still with the employer. For these employees
can, in their own right, enforce contract provisions against the employer.
The judgment in Fernekes should have been affirmed.
Robert L. Berchem
24. 4 WILLISTON, CO TRAC'rS § 621 (3d ed. 1961). See Sigman v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, I1" N.E.2d 878 (1937), for an application of this
principle in this area.
25. This is especially true when, as in the instant case, the plan provided that
the amounts to be contributed to each division were to be kept separate and limited
accordingly.
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